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FREE SPEECH AND THE END OF DRESS CODES AND
MANDATORY UNIFORMS IN MISSISSIPPI PUBLIC SCHOOLS
JoAnne Nelson Shepherd*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Community
School District' granted broad First Amendment rights to students in the areas of
freedom of speech and expression.' Since Tinker, courts have often had to weigh
and balance school districts' authority to govern students' First Amendment
rights, and parents' rights to control their children's education. This article
examines those cases and, specifically, how courts in Mississippi and the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals balanced those competing interests.
II. SYMBOLIC CLOTHING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Three years before Tinker, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education? In Blackwell, students at
the all-black Henry Weathers High School sought to enjoin school administrators
from enforcing a regulation that prohibited students from wearing freedom but-
tons.4 The buttons depicted a joined white and black hand and the acronym
"SNCC" (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee).' The students contend-
ed that the school's regulation violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.6
Almost thirty students wore freedom buttons to class one Friday morning.7
The principal learned that some of the button-wearing students were talking
loudly in the hall instead of going to class.' Three students were brought to the
office when they failed to remove their buttons.' When school resumed on
Monday, almost 150 students wore the buttons.'" Students handed buttons to
other students and even pinned them on some students who had not asked for
them." The school alleged that the students' actions created chaos, interfered
with instruction, and caused a complete collapse of discipline.12 In light of these
disturbances, the principal banned the buttons and sent home those students who
disregarded the ban.'" The next day, notwithstanding the ban, nearly 200 stu-
dents wore the buttons."
* The author is District Counsel for Jackson Public Schools. Chris Coleman and Corey Radicioni con-
tributed to the research of this article.
1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2. Id.
3. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).




8. Id. at 750-51.




13. Id. at 751 n.3.
14. Id. at 751.
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The court concluded that the regulation that forbade the buttons in school
was reasonable and denied the injunction.15 By the court's definition, a reason-
able regulation is one that is "essential in maintaining order and discipline on
school property" and "which measurably contributes to the maintenance of order
and decorum within the educational system."'" Applying the definition of rea-
sonable regulation to the circumstances at hand, the court found that the regula-
tion was necessary to keep students from disrupting the school climate. 7 The
court further noted that when a regulation limits freedom of expression and the
communication of an idea that is protected by the First Amendment, reviewing
courts must balance the circumstances and weigh the substantiality or sufficiency
of the reasons advanced which gave rise to the need for the regulation. 8
The Fifth Circuit pointed out that the right to freedom of speech is not an
"absolute right to speak." 9 Nevertheless, a substantial and fundamental interest
must exist in order for the regulation or restriction of speech to be upheld." The
Blackwell court found that the school had both a legitimate, substantial interest
in the orderly conduct of the school and a duty to protect that interest.
2'
Accordingly, the regulation was upheld.2
Burnside v. Byars,23 a case from the Booker T. Washington High School in
Philadelphia, Mississippi, which also involved freedom buttons, was decided by
the Fifth Circuit on the same day as the Blackwell case but, interestingly, with a
different result. 2' The buttons in Burnside were inscribed with the slogan "One
Man One Vote" and the acromoym "SNCC. ' '2' The principal summarily banned
the buttons.26 He testified that the regulation was enacted because the buttons
were irrelevant to student education, would cause commotion, and would disrupt
the school day. Approximately thirty to forty students wore the buttons in spite
of the ban.28 The evidence also revealed that students formerly wore "Beatle"
buttons, "his and her" buttons, and buttons with student initials, none of which
were banned.29 Furthermore, the record revealed that the students wore the free-
dom buttons to silently communicate an idea and to encourage the community to
exercise their civil rights."
Because the wearing of the buttons did not disturb classroom instruction or
the school day, the school failed to show that its regulation was necessary to
15. Id. at 754.
16. Id. at 753 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966)).
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing Thornhill v. St. of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)).
19. Id. at 754 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)).
20. Id. (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 746.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 746-47.
28. Id. at 747.
29. Id. at 746 n.2.
30. Id. at 747 n.5.
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keep order and discipline." Therefore, the regulation promulgated by the princi-
pal was unreasonable and infringed, without justification, on students' protected
rights of freedom of expression. 2 School administrators are not free to ignore
expressions of opinions which they do not want to address.
Shortly after the Fifth Circuit decided the Burnside and Blackwell cases, the
United States Supreme Court decided Tinker v. Des Moines which addressed
whether a regulation prohibiting students from wearing armbands protesting the
Vietnam War and advocating peace violated their free speech rights.' The arm-
band that the students wore on their sleeves consisted of a two-inch wide band of
black cloth. Students who wore the armband did not disrupt school activities
although some discussion occurred outside the classroom. 36 Apparently, only
seven students refused to comply with the regulation. 7
The Supreme Court recognized that teachers and students have protected
First Amendment rights that are not "shed ... at the schoolhouse gate."'  The
wearing of the armbands involved First Amendment rights "akin to pure speech"
and caused no disruption of school.39 In Tinker, the Des Moines Community
School District felt that demonstrations should not occur at school, which was
based partly on the fact that a student was killed in the Vietnam War and his
friends still attended the school.4
"In order for a [school district] to [defend its] prohibition of a particular
expression [or] opinion, it must [show] ... more than a mere desire to avoid dis-
comfort and unpleasant[ry] that always accompan[ies] an unpopular view-
point."'" Absent a finding or showing that participating in the proscribed "con-
duct materially and substantially" interferes with school operations and disci-
pline, the regulation cannot be upheld.42
School administrators do not have absolute authority over their students. 3
Therefore, when the administration cannot advance constitutionally valid reasons
to support regulation of student speech, "students are entitled to freedom of
expression of their views" and opinions." The Court reversed the suspensions
and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion.4
31. Id. at 748.
32. Id. at 748-49.
33. Id. at 749.
34. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
35. Id. at 514.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 516 (Black, J. dissenting).
38. Id. at 506.
39. Id. at 505-06.
40. Id. at 509 n.3.
41. Id. at 509.
42. Id. (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749).
43. Id. at 511.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 514.
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A. Students' School Appearance and the First Amendment
The Tinker Court noted that the offensive school regulation did not relate to
the regulation of skirt or dress length, other type of clothes, or hairstyle.46 This
dictum may lead one to suspect that the right to select one's hairstyle or length or
skirt length may enjoy less protection under the First Amendment than speech or
symbolic conduct.
An examination of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Ferrell v.
Dallas Independent School District47 shows that the suspicion is correct. The
Dallas Independent School District refused to enroll three male students who
wore "Beatle" haircuts.48 The students also played in a band or with other musi-
cal groups, and argued that their long hair was standard and necessary in the
entertainment industry.49
The principal said that boys with long hair experienced harassment and
taunting from other students."0 The students challenged the school's rule to cut
or trim their hair on the grounds that it was unconstitutional under state law, that
it denied them due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that it resulted
in discrimination against them under § 1981 and § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.5"
The Texas State Constitution, Article 7 contained the following language:
"A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the lib-
erties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State
to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an
efficient system of public free schools." 2
State laws vested in the board of trustees the exclusive authority to manage
and govern the public schools.5 3 The long hair ban violated neither the state
statute nor the state constitution.' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the ban was not arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, or unreasonable in light of the
broad statutory authority to manage schools and problems that the long hair
caused.55
The court then addressed whether a violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment occurred. It assumed, but did not decide, that one's hair
style was a form of expression protected by the Constitution. 6 However, this
protection did not afford an absolute right to freedom of expression. The right
could be impeded upon if the State presented compelling reasons to do so."
The court concluded that the school, acting for the State of Texas, had a com-
46. Id. at 507-08.
47. 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968).
48. Id. at 698.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 700-01.
51. Id. at 698.
52. Id. at 701 (quoting TEX. CONST. art. 7, § 1).
53. Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2780).
54. Id. at 702.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 702-03.
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pelling interest in the management of an efficient, effective school.
58
Distractions that hinder or interfere with that interest must be eliminated or
diminished. 9 Accordingly, the Dallas school district did not violate the substan-
tive or procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The school's regulation also passed muster under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42
U.S.C. § 1983.1 Neither did the regulation interfere with the students' liberty
interests because they could continue with their professional career as
musicians.62
The regulation of hair length was again challenged by a high school male
student in Karr v. Schmidt.63 The district court struck down the regulation, but
the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that a student had no constitutional right to
wear his or her hair as it suited the wearer.64
The First Amendment is the most frequently asserted basis to wear long hair
as symbolic speech.65 Arguably, long hair symbolizes one's uniqueness and
rejection of conventional values.6 However, the court in Karr was not fully per-
suaded by the First Amendment argument.67 The court was not convinced that
long hair had sufficient communicative content to warrant constitutional protec-
tion under the First Amendment.6" Some students wore their hair long to convey
a message, but for others such as Chelsey Karr, it was a purely personal prefer-
ence.6 9 The Karr Court read the Tinker language about hairstyles and skirt
lengths to mean that the right to style one's hair as one wishes in public school
was not protected by the First Amendment. 0
The Fifth Circuit further opined that the right to wear long hair does not cre-
ate a risk to the level of fundamental significance or a fundamental individual
liberty such as marital privacy, freedom of speech, association, and religion. 1
The interference with one's liberty is, as the court noted in Ferrell v. Dallas
Independent School District, temporary and insignificant due to the various
grooming options.7 2 Neither did the regulation violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Because a suspect class such as race or
wealth is not involved, the school district need only show a rational basis for the
classification. 4 The regulation or classification met this standard of review. 5
58. Id. at 703.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 704.
62. Id.
63. 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972).






70. Id. at 614.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 615 (citing Ferrell v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 856 (5th Cir. 1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
73. Id. at 616.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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Apparently frustrated with the flurry of similar cases involving hair length,
the Fifth Circuit announced a per se rule that regulations prohibiting long hair
are valid." Lower courts were instructed to grant motions of dismissal for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
B. Exceptions To Protection of Student Free Speech
The United States Supreme Court decided three significant cases that dealt
with students' freedom of speech and expression under the First Amendment.
This trilogy of cases created three exceptions to the absolute protection of stu-
dent speech that would keep school officials in compliance with the First
Amendment. As discussed earlier in this article, in Tinker, the Court required a
material and substantial disruption to the school operation or interference with
the rights of other students before school officials could regulate student
speech. 8 In Bethel School District v. Fraser,9 the Court retreated from Tinker
and allowed the regulation of student speech that is offensive, lewd, or vulgar
and occurs during a school-sponsored activity or assembly.8" Finally, in
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeir,81 the court approved the regulation of student speech in
school-sponsored publications and productions when it is related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.82 Fraser and Hazelwood are each examined below.
Fraser, a high school student, delivered a nominating speech to an assembly
of approximately 600 students.83 Excerpts of the speech follow:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in
his shirt. . . his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kulman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If
necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't
attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and pushing
until finally-he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for
each and every one ... '
Aware of his intentions to deliver the speech, teachers warned Fraser that it
might violate the school's disruptive conduct rule which banned conduct that
would substantially interfere with the educational process, including obscene,
profane language.8"
76. Id. at 617.
77. Id. at 618.
78. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.




83. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677.
84. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 678.
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Chief Justice Burger noted that children do not have the same latitude as the
adult citizenry. In its deliberation of what level of First Amendment protection
to give Fraser's speech, the Court noted that the freedom to advocate unpopular
and controversial views in public schools must be balanced against society's
interest in educating students about the limitations of acceptable behavior. 6
"[T]he constitutional rights of students in public school[s] are not automatically
coextensive with rights of [adult citizens] in other settings.""r School boards
should be empowered to determine what type of speech in the class or assembly
is appropriate.88
The Court contrasted Tinker by noting that the penalties imposed in Fraser
were unrelated to any political viewpoint.89 The First Amendment did not pre-
vent schools from determining that a vulgar statement would undercut its educa-
tional mission. Accordingly, the Court held that the school acted within its per-
missible authority to discipline Fraser because of his "offensively lewd" state-
ments. 1
In Hazelwood, the court failed to find a violation of students' free speech
rights when the principal deleted pages from the school newspaper.2 The
respondents were three former high school students who served as staff members
of the school's newspaper, Spectrum.93 They alleged that the school district vio-
lated their First Amendment rights when the principal deleted from a certain
issue of the paper two pages that included an article about pregnant students and
an article about divorce.94 The principal deleted the article about pregnancy
because he was fearful that students who were pregnant could be identified by
the text of the article. 9 He also deleted the article about divorce because he ini-
tially thought a student was named in the article and that her parents should have
the opportunity to consent to the article or to respond to it. 6 The school district
allocated funds on an annual basis for the printing of the newspaper. 7 These
funds were supplemented by sales of the paper. 8 During the 1982-1983 school
year, more than 4,500 copies of the paper were distributed.9
The question in Hazelwood concerned the school's authority over school-
sponsored publications, theatrical productions, or other expressive activities that
students or the public might reasonably perceive to bear the school's stamp of
approval. I00 Although these activities may not occur in the traditional class set-
86. Id. at 681.
87. Id. at 682 (quoting N. J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985)).
88. Id. at 683.
89. Id. at 685.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 484 U.S. 260.
93. Id. at 262.
94. Id. at 262-63.
95. Id. at 263.
96. Id.
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ting, they can be viewed as part of the school curriculum if they are supervised
by faculty members and if the purpose of the activities is "designed to impart
particular knowledge or skills to student[s] ... and [the] audience[]."''
The Court recognized that schools must "have the authority to refuse to
sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate" unsa-
vory activity such as "drug or alcohol use [or] irresponsible sex," or any other
behavior that is "inconsistent with the 'shared values of a civilized social
order." 1 2 Failure to exercise such authority would restrict or limit the schools
in their role as "a principle instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust nor-
mally to his environment."'' 3 The Court found no violation of the First
Amendment and held that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech ... [if]
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."'0 4 The
Court concluded that the school acted reasonably in requiring the redaction or
deletion of the offending articles on teenage pregnancy and divorce.'
C. Students' Constitutional Rights and Mandatory School Uniforms
Often the courts are called to address matters by school officials that deal
with quality of education in public schools. The Fifth Circuit in Canady v.
Bossier Parish School Board1"6 addressed whether or not the school board's
mandatory school uniform policy violated the First Amendment rights of stu-
dents.' In that case, the Louisiana legislature gave school boards the authority
to implement mandatory school uniforms provided that the boards notified par-
ents in writing of the dress requirement. 8
In an effort to withstand the parents' and students' challenge of the uniform
policy, the school district introduced affidavits of teachers and principals who
concluded that the uniform policy reduced behavioral problems and increased
student achievement. 9 The parents argued that the enforcement of the school
uniform policy violated their constitutional rights."0
Before analyzing the parents' argument, the Fifth Circuit considered
whether a person's choice of attire is a form of speech protected by the First
Amendment."' The court acknowledged certain clothing may have sufficient
communicative content to warrant First Amendment protection."2 The test used
101. Id. at 271.
102. Id. at 272 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).
103. Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
104. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
105. Id. at 274.
106. 240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 438 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.7 (1997)).
109. Id. at 439.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 441 n.3.
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in Texas v. Johnson later addressed symbolic conduct.113 The court acknowl-
edged that while certain forms of expressive conduct and speech are sheltered
under the First Amendment, constitutional protection is not absolute, particularly
in a public school."' "School boards, [rather than] federal courts, [are empow-
ered to] decide what constitutes appropriate behavior and dress in public
schools."'' 5
The Fifth Circuit applied the test articulated by the Supreme Court in
O'Brien v. United States to the school's uniform policy, and stated that the poli-
cy passed muster "if it further[ed] an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the interest [was] unrelated to the suppression of student expression;
and if the incidental restrictions on First Amendment activities [were] no more
than ... necessary to facilitate that interest." '16 In its analysis of the O'Brien
test, the Fifth Circuit determined that improving the educational process is
unquestionably an important interest of the school board.1 7 The board's purpose
for enacting or enforcing the uniform policy was to increase student achieve-
ment and to reduce disciplinary problems. "' That purpose was "in no way relat-
ed to the suppression of student speech."' 19 The incidental restrictions were few.
Students remained free to wear what they wanted after school hours. They could
express their views through other means during the school day. The regulation
did not bar any important communication among students.
20
The parents advanced a Fourteenth Amendment argument that students had
a liberty interest in choosing to wear whatever they wish.21 However, the court
failed to address this issue.1 22 The parents then argued that requiring parents to
buy uniforms created or placed too great of a financial burden on them and
denied some students who could not afford the uniforms the right to a free edu-
cation as provided by the state constitution. 123 The court did not address this
issue because the parents did not outline a recognizable argument on which
relief could be granted. 24 The court noted, however, that the school board had
furnished evidence that community organizations donated uniforms to the
schools for those who could not afford them and that uniforms were inexpensive
and even less expensive than a normal outfit.'
25
The Fifth Circuit also addressed the mandatory uniform policy in Littlefield
v. Forney Independent School District.2 6 A school district in Texas had adopted
113. Id. at 441 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)).
114. Id. at 441.
115. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)).
116. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
117. Id. (citing Hazelwood, 448 U.S. at 271-72).
118. Id.
119. Id.






126. 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
a mandatory uniform policy as authorized by the Texas statutes.'27 In Texas, the
statute provided that school boards could adopt a school uniform policy if the
board determined that the requirement would improve the learning environment
at the school.'28 The statute further provided that the regulations of the board
must identify a funding source that can be used to provide uniforms to students
who are financially or educationally disadvantaged. The statute further provided
that a parent could elect for a student to be exempt from the requirement and to
transfer to a school where uniforms were not required, based on space availabili-
ty and the statement of a bona fide, religious or philosophical objection to the
requirement.'29
In Littlefield, the court recognized that the First Amendment protected sym-
bols and conduct. 3 The Fifth Circuit applied the O'Brien test and found that
the policy did not violate the First Amendment.' The school district asserted
that the uniform policy was adopted to promote school spirit, school values, pro-
mote decorum and respect for authority, and to reduce drop out rates.'32 Its pur-
pose was also to increase student safety by reducing gang and drug-related activ-
ity.'33 Failure to comply with the policy resulted in a progression of disciplinary
action including placement of students in isolation until the parent brought
appropriate clothing or for the entire day, placement in behavior adjustment
modification for a minimum of three days, placement in the behavior adjustment
modification program for a maximum of two weeks, or expulsion to the alterna-
tive program."
D. Implementation of a Dress Code or Mandatory Uniform Policy in Mississippi
The Mississippi Constitution entitles children to a free public education.'35
The Mississippi Supreme Court also recognizes public education as a fundamen-
tal right.'36 Local school boards govern the local school districts. 37 School
boards are vested with broad statutory powers and authority, which includes the
power to suspend or expel students, change the placement to the alternative
school, and provide support to the superintendent, teachers, and principals to
ensure proper discipline.'38 Superintendents are the chief executive officers of
school districts, and are responsible for the administration of the district and
implementation of board policy.'39 Each year, the superintendent prepares a
Code of Conduct handbook for parents and students. 4  The handbook outlines
127. Id. at 279.
128. Id. at 279 n.2 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.162 (Vernon 1996)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 282.
131. Id. at286.
132. Id. at 280.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 280-81.
135. MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 201 (1890).
136. Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 240-42 (Miss. 1985).
137. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-7-301 (1972).
138. Id. at § 37-7-301(e), (g).
139. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-9-301 (1972).
140. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-9-14 (1972).
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the district's discipline plan."1 Parents must sign a statement indicating that they
have received notice of the handbook or discipline plan. "2 The handbook usual-
ly contains a list of articles of clothing that cannot be wom at school. Dress
codes and mandatory school uniforms are tools that schools use to address safety
concerns and promote high student achievement.
There is no Mississippi statute that addresses dress codes and mandatory uni-
forms. Nevertheless, in 2003-04, the Jackson Public School District implement-
ed a dress code policy that required the shirttails of all students to be tucked in
pants or skirts.'43 The district had learned that weapons could be easily hidden
underneath shirttails. The district also wanted to promote high self-esteem. It
published pictures of appropriate dress and inappropriate dress in its hand-
book."' Inappropriate dress included house slippers, shirts with spaghetti straps,
shirts with the midriff exposed, muscle shirts, sagging pants, revealing under-
wear, unkempt facial hair, and short dresses or skirts. 4 s
The following year, based upon a recommendation from an ad hoc school
uniform committee, the board of trustees approved a one-year mandatory uni-
form policy for those elementary and middle schools whose site councils chose
to participate.' 46 The policy was modeled upon the policy approved by the
Littlefield court. The administration of participating schools will study the pilot
program for permanent implementation in the 2005-2006 school year. 47 The
purpose of the policy was to promote a positive school environment, which is a
major factor in high student achievement.'48 The district wanted to ensure safety,
discipline, and school unity to reflect its strategic goal of 95% overall proficien-
cy per student.'49 The uniform policy identifies students who belong on campus,
making it easier to identify visitors who may be there for disruptive purposes.'
Wearing uniforms fosters unity by reducing negative competition and arguments
over dress styles, which allows students to focus on academic standards, self-
confidence and understanding diversity.'
The uniforms are inexpensive and readily available for all students.
5 2
Parents who cannot afford the uniforms may complete a Declaration of Hardship
in Providing Student Uniform form to request assistance from the local site
council or other district resources as required by Miss. Code Ann. § 37-7-335. l"3
Parents who object to their children wearing uniforms for religious reasons may
submit their reasons in writing to the principal for consideration by the adminis-
141. MIss. CODE ANN. § 37-11-53 (1972).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. JACKSON PUB. SCH. DIST. HANDBOOK AND CODE OF CONDUCT 51-52 (2003-2004).
145. Id. at 52.
146. Id.
147. JACKSON PUB. SCH. DIST. HANDBOOK AND CODE OF CONDUCT 54-55 (2004-2005).
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tration and site council.'" The school district uses a progression of discipline for
non-compliance with the uniform policy.15 The discipline ranges from a letter
of warning to the parent to two days of suspension that may occur in school or at
home.15 6 The school district only imposes a suspension as a last resort.'
57
Although at the time of this article school has only been in session a short
time, school officials have reported a positive response to the uniform policy.
Community organizations have been supportive by donating uniforms. Most
parents have also expressed their support. As of the writing of this article, there
have been no legal challenges to the implementation of the policy.
III. CONCLUSION
Under certain circumstances, the imposition of a mandatory uniform policy
and student dress code does not violate the First Amendment rights of public
school students. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set out in Littlefield
the appropriate analysis for weighing the competing student, parental and district
interests. Presumably, so long as the policy incorporates the following criteria:
" The availability of financial assistance or free uniforms for parents and
students who cannot afford the uniforms;
" A series of escalating disciplinary consequences;
* An exemption for religious or similar philosophical reasons; and
* Prior notification and an opportunity to be heard;
a mandatory uniform policy should be upheld.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. JACKSON PUB. SCH. DIST. HANDBOOK AND CODE OF CONDUCT 55 (2004-2005).
157. Id.
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